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Abstract 
The Dunning-Kruger effect (DKE) is the finding that, across a wide range of tasks, poor 
performers greatly overestimate their ability, while top performers make more accurate self-
assessments. The original account of the DKE involves the idea that metacognitive insight 
requires the same skills as task performance, so that unskilled people perform poorly and lack 
insight. However, global measures of self-assessment are prone to statistical and other biases 
that could explain the same pattern. We used psychophysical methods to examine 
metacognitive insight in simple movement and spatial memory tasks: pointing at a dot, or 
recalling its position after a delay. We measured task skill in an initial block, and self-
assessment in a second block, in which participants judged after every trial whether they had 
hit the target or not. Metacognitive calibration and sensitivity were related to task skill, but a 
path analysis showed that their net contribution to the DKE was weak. The major driver of 
the DKE was the level of task performance. In a second study, we again measured task skill 
in an initial block, but titrated task difficulty in the second block so that all participants 
performed at equivalent levels of success. Metacognitive measures were again related to task 
skill but the DKE pattern was eliminated. We present a simple model of these findings, 
showing that metacognitive differences can contribute to the DKE, but are neither necessary 
nor sufficient for it. This analysis clarifies and quantifies how metacognitive insight and other 
factors interact to determine this famous effect. 
 
Keywords: Dunning-Kruger effect; metacognition; performance monitoring; self-evaluation; 
overconfidence 
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Introduction 
“The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool.” 
William Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act V, Scene I. 
 
This quotation, like others expressing similar ideas, has the appeal of instant connection. We 
can readily bring to mind examples that fit the template; even if we temporarily overlook 
counter-examples of the diffident fool or the arrogant genius. In experimental psychology, the 
idea is encapsulated by the Dunning-Kruger effect (DKE), the finding that, across a wide 
range of tasks, the poorest performers greatly overestimate their own ability, whilst the top 
performers make more accurate self-assessments. This statement of inverse correlation might 
lack the poetry of Shakespeare, but it has gained an almost viral momentum in contemporary 
discourse, particularly in the wake of the 2016 US Presidential election. But, even as the 
DKE has been embraced by the wider public, there has been debate within the psychological 
literature. The pattern is not in doubt; the basic fact of relatively more overestimation 
amongst the objectively poorest performers is replicable across a wide range of cognitive and 
social tasks (see Dunning, 2011), and has recently been extended to the domain of political 
beliefs (Hall & Raimi, 2018). The debate is about the correct explanation for the effect, and 
in particular whether the DKE implies metacognitive differences between the skilled and the 
unskilled in a given domain. 
 
Theoretical accounts of the DKE 
The original, ‘dual-burden’ account offered by Kruger and Dunning (1999) hinges on the 
premise that, for many tasks, accurate appraisal of one’s own performance depends on the 
same skills required for accurate performance. For instance, to judge the grammaticality of a 
sentence correctly, one must have the grammatical knowledge needed to compose it. Kruger 
and Dunning argued that the lowest performers in a task suffer a dual burden: not only is their 
performance poor, but they have a corresponding metacognitive deficit that impedes the 
ability to distinguish accurate from inaccurate performance. Unable to discern their own 
errors, poor performers assume they make fewer errors than in fact they do, resulting in 
overestimation. Conversely, high performers, with better task skills, have more metacognitive 
insight, so make more accurate, better-calibrated self-estimates. However, when ranking 
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themselves relative to others, high performers may still fall prey to a ‘false consensus’ effect, 
mistakenly assuming that other people’s abilities are more similar to their own than they 
really are. High performers thus tend to underestimate themselves when using relative scales, 
but show less consistent under- or over-estimation when making absolute estimates 
(Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 2008). Low performers overestimate 
themselves on both relative and absolute scales. At its broadest, the DKE is characterised by 
greater overestimation of own performance in low performers relative to high performers, 
that is, by a negative correlation between task skill and estimation error. 
Competing accounts of the DKE focus on other mechanisms that might induce this 
pattern. One mechanism often invoked is regression to the mean (Ackerman, Beier, & 
Bowen, 2002; Burson, Larrick, & Klayman, 2006; Feld, Sauermann, & de Grip, 2017; 
Krueger & Mueller, 2002; Nuhfer, Cogan, Fleisher, Gaze, & Wirth, 2016; Nuhfer, Fleisher, 
Cogan, Wirth, & Gaze, 2017). The usual method for studying the DKE involves ranking 
people by task performance and examining the relationship with estimation error, as indexed 
by the subtraction of actual from estimated performance. A negative correlation is virtually 
guaranteed in this scenario; just as, for any two imperfectly correlated random variables, x 
correlates negatively with y-x (for a general primer, see Campbell & Kenny, 1999). In 
concrete terms, as long as participants do not have perfect insight into their performance, then 
any chance variations that increase errors will be inadequately tracked in self-estimation, 
pushing people down the ranks of performance and simultaneously biasing them towards 
over-estimation; and vice-versa for chance variations that reduce errors. This artefact is 
important to recognise, but relatively easy to eliminate. It is driven by unreliability in the 
measurement of performance, so it can be offset statistically by quantifying and controlling 
for this unreliability (Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Feld et al., 2017; Krueger & Mueller, 2002; 
Kruger & Dunning, 2002), or it can avoided entirely by using separate sub-sets of trials to 
index performance and to calculate estimation error (Burson et al., 2006; Feld et al., 2017; 
Klayman, Soll, González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999). If either of these steps is taken, the DKE 
is attenuated, but it is not eliminated, so further factors must also be at work. 
One such factor may be another regressive tendency, which can persist even when 
regression to the mean is controlled for. If participants have imperfect knowledge of their 
performance, their estimation errors need not be random, but may be systematically biased. 
For many abilities and tasks, at least those that are relatively easy, people tend to evaluate 
their relative standing optimistically, a bias known as the better-than-average effect (see 
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Kruger, 1999). If self-estimates are biased toward a high percentile, then higher performers 
will appear to be better-calibrated just by happening to perform closer to that percentile 
(Krueger & Mueller, 2002). This idea can be generalised to more difficult tasks, in which 
people’s relative estimates may instead show a pessimistic, worse-than-average effect 
(Kruger, 1999). Burson and colleagues (2006) contrasted difficult and easy tasks, for instance 
questions about years of Nobel prizes requiring precise (within 5 years) or approximate 
(within 30 years) answers. They broadly confirmed that increased difficulty reduced the 
average percentile self-estimate, so that poor performers now seemed better calibrated, 
reducing and even reversing the asymmetry of the classic DKE. 
Burson and colleagues (2006) argued that a sufficient account of the DKE is given by 
a ‘noise-plus-bias’ model, in which uncertainty of self-estimation (noise) is combined with a 
bias towards a task-specific default estimate. This model assumes that participants lack 
metacognitive insight into their performance, making their estimates uncertain, but that this is 
equally true for all participants, regardless of task skill. The model was proposed to account 
for relative self-estimates, so the fact that the DKE arises even for absolute estimates has 
been used to discount it (see Dunning, 2011). However, it would be possible to extend the 
noise-plus-bias model to absolute self-estimates, by proposing that people have task-specific 
biases to estimate a certain level of performance, not just a certain relative standing. If this 
default level is optimistic (i.e. higher than the true mean), then the poorest performers will 
overestimate, and the top performers will seem better calibrated, even if all participants are 
equally lacking in metacognitive insight. 
 
The question of metacognition 
Thus, to support the original, dual-burden account of the DKE, it is not enough just to show 
that the effect persists once regression-to-the-mean has been controlled for, or when absolute 
self-estimates are used. It is necessary to positively demonstrate metacognitive differences 
between high and low performers, and to show that they causally mediate the DKE. The 
original report by Kruger and Dunning (1999, Study 4) did include a proposed measure of 
metacognition. After completing a ten-item logical reasoning task and giving global ratings 
of how they thought they had performed, participants returned to their test sheets and tried to 
identify, item-by-item, which questions they had answered correctly. ‘Metacognitive skill’, 
measured by summing the total number of accurate identifications, correlated strongly with 
Page 6 of 43 
task performance and with estimation error, and the latter relationship persisted even when 
the former was controlled for. However, Krueger and Mueller (2002) pointed out that this 
pattern could be also be explained by a general optimism bias. For instance, if all participants 
guessed that they had performed at 60% correct, with no metacognitive insight, they would 
mark six of the ten answers as correct at random. Every objectively correct item would have a 
.6 chance of being identified accurately, whilst every incorrect item would have only a .4 
chance of being identified accurately, so the overall accuracy of chance identifications would 
increase linearly with objective performance. Krueger and Mueller (2002) went on to 
replicate the mediational role of this measure of metacognition, but they showed that it 
disappeared for an adjusted score that took account of the confound with performance. 
 Burson and colleagues (2006) took a different approach to metacognition, 
distinguishing between metacognitive calibration and sensitivity. The typical measure of 
estimation error is concerned with calibration (divergence of estimated from actual 
performance), but is unreliable, because a person with no insight can appear to be well-
calibrated by guessing a value that happens to be close to their true performance. They 
proposed an alternative measure, of metacognitive sensitivity, given by the degree to which 
estimated performance tracks actual performance across participants. They calculated this 
correlation separately for top- and bottom-half performers. The results were mixed but, across 
three studies, bottom-half performers tended to show weaker correlations (lower sensitivity). 
However, Burson and colleagues warned that this correlation-based measure was also 
vulnerable to distortions. For instance, if the range of performance was more compressed 
amongst lower-half participants, then the measure of metacognitive sensitivity would be 
artificially reduced. They concluded that there was tentative evidence for reduced 
metacognitive sensitivity amongst poor performers, but that this did not imply poorer 
metacognitive calibration, and did not explain the DKE. 
 
Foundations for an empirical test 
The original hypothesis that the DKE is due to differences in metacognitive insight linked to 
task ability remains open to debate. Indeed, no study (to our knowledge) has had 
metacognitive measures that could furnish a fair test of this hypothesis. For this purpose, we 
require adequate measures of metacognition embedded within tasks that elicit the DKE. The 
defining character of the DKE is a relative overestimation of own-performance amongst the 
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least skilled participants; and the range of tasks on which this pattern has been replicated is 
wide. The majority of these tasks have emphasised high-level intellectual or social expertise, 
such as logical reasoning, judgement of humour, or domain-specific (or general) knowledge 
(see Dunning, 2011, for an overview). In principle, though, the same pattern might be 
expected for any domain of skilled performance, if certain task conditions are met. 
First, the task should be within the competence of participants, yet neither too easy 
nor too difficult, so that between-participant variations in performance can be measured 
across the range. Second, test-retest reliabilities should be high enough that these variations 
in performance can be meaningfully linked to differences in task skill. Third, and crucially, 
feedback should be sparse enough that participants have some uncertainty about their level of 
success. Dunning (2011, p276) has described this critical condition as the absence of a 
‘direct-access cue’: a lack of direct feedback. He pointed out that many intellectual tasks do 
not have a directly observable outcome, whereas physical tasks often do, which may help 
explain why correlations of self-evaluation with real ability are often stronger for physical 
tasks (Mabe & West, 1982). For the intellectual task of judging the comedy value of jokes, 
for instance, there is no direct feedback; but for the physical task of shooting basketballs, we 
can just see how each ball lands. However, it is important to note that this is not an intrinsic 
difference between domains; we could just as well reverse it by occluding the view of the 
hoop after each ball is launched, and by providing a live comedy audience to give direct 
feedback on how each joke lands. The critical condition is the lack of direct feedback, not the 
domain of expertise. 
 For metacognitive differences to drive the DKE, it should also be plausible that 
insight could draw on some of same processes that underlie task performance. This is almost 
guaranteed by the condition that direct feedback is unavailable. If we cannot judge our 
success by observing an outcome directly, our recourse must be to the internal process that 
informed our response, and/or to indirect cues correlated with it. In a test of knowledge, our 
certainty about the rightness of our response could be a function of the clarity of our semantic 
representation, which we may introspect upon directly, or infer from our ease of retrieval, or 
behavioural correlates such as decision speed (Dunning & Perretta, 2002; Kelley & Lindsay, 
1993). Provided – and this is not guaranteed – that our representations are generally clearer 
for correct responses, then our sense of certainty will roughly track our chance of success, 
and we will have some metacognitive insight. The overlap between cognitive and 
metacognitive processes could only ever be partial (by definition, second-order 
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metacognition cannot be identical with first-order cognition), and it may vary from task-to-
task. But there is no reason to think it should be specific to intellectual expertise, excluding 
simpler cognitive and physical skills (Augustyn & Rosenbaum, 2005). In any case, the 
predicted relationship between skill and insight is an empirical matter. It cannot just be 
asserted for any task; it needs to be tested, using adequate measures of metacognition. 
 
A novel approach to the DKE 
In establishing such measures, we pick up on Burson and colleagues’ (2006) conceptual 
distinction between sensitivity and calibration as separable sub-components of metacognitive 
insight. Sensitivity implies an ability to detect variations in one’s performance, whilst 
calibration reflects the correspondence or divergence between one’s subjective criterion for 
success, and the objective criterion. If we combine this with item-by-item self-estimation, we 
can frame a classical psychophysical analysis. The metacognitive task is to discriminate 
successful items or trials (hits) from unsuccessful ones (misses), given a varying signal 
strength (size of response error on some task-relevant dimension). Over sufficient trials, we 
can fit a logistic function to the probability of hit reports across levels of response error. If the 
participant has no insight, or if the response errors do not span the subjective transition from 
hits to misses, the fit will fail. But if the fit is good, then the function will define a threshold 
(at which the probability of reporting a hit is .5), and a just noticeable difference (for a .25 
change in probability of reporting a hit). The threshold will quantify the participant’s 
subjective criterion for success (calibration) and the just noticeable difference will quantify 
their sensitivity. These metacognitive measures are in principle independent from 
performance, providing an adequate basis for testing the relation between task performance 
and metacognition, and thus the role of metacognition in determining the DKE. 
 In the present study, we move away from higher-level intellectual skills, to the more 
tractable domains of movement and spatial memory: pointing at a dot on a screen, or 
recalling its position after a delay. These tasks give continuous measures of response error, 
and permit large numbers of trials, with online (trial-by-trial) reports of perceived success or 
failure, sufficient for a psychophysical analysis of metacognitive insight at the participant 
level. The tasks are simple, but they fulfil the core requirements for the DKE to emerge. They 
are within the competence of participants, yet not at floor or ceiling, and test-retest 
reliabilities are high enough to establish between-participant differences in skill. We have 
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implemented the tasks with sparse feedback, so that participants have some uncertainty about 
their performance. Finally, it is plausible that metacognitive insight on these tasks might 
depend on the same core competencies as performance. For instance, to point accurately to 
target dots, one must have a precise forward model of movement, to enable the rapid 
detection and correction of errors. Participants with more precise forward models will be 
more accurate in pointing, and better equipped to evaluate their accuracy. In remembering dot 
positions, participants with a more precise spatial memory will be more accurate, but may 
also have more diagnostic variation in their sense of certainty on occasions that their 
representation is less precise. 
In Experiment 1, we propose to assess the DKE in movement and memory, using 
online self-estimation across hundreds of trials. This will allow for an aggregate analysis of 
estimation error, to determine whether the DKE generalises to these novel tasks, and to an 
online estimation method. Crucially, it will also support a rigorous, theoretically-grounded, 
psychophysical analysis, to quantify metacognitive calibration and sensitivity in every 
participant. These innovations allow us to mount the first adequate test of the now-famous, 
dual-burden account of the DKE: that less skilled participants not only perform more poorly, 
but have less metacognitive insight, and that this mediates the inverse correlation between 
task skill and estimation error. 
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Experiment 1: Methods 
Our tasks were developed through extensive piloting. Our methods and predictions were then 
preregistered on the Open Science Framework https://osf.io/ccgsz/ (see Supplemental 
materials S1). Experiment 1 was approved by the Psychology Research Committee, 
University of Edinburgh (approval#105-16171). We report how we determined our sample 
size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures. 
 
Participants and power 
A sample size of 84 would provide .80 power to detect a correlation of .30, our minimum 
expected effect size of interest, based on pilot data. A total of 101 healthy participants were 
recruited amongst students and alumni of the University of Edinburgh, mostly in their early 
20’s (min 18, 1st quartile 20, median 21, 3rd quartile 23, max 42 years), and mostly female (82 
female, 19 male) and right-handed (94 right-handed, 7 left-handed, by self-report). After 




Each task, Movement and Memory, had a baseline block and a main block. Task order 
(Movement or Memory first) was alternated between participants. In each task, participants 
sat in front of a touchscreen (340 x 270 mm, 1024 x 768 pixels, ~0.33 mm per pixel), under 
dim ambient lighting, with the preferred hand resting on a start button 350 mm from the 
screen, and ~150 mm in front of the body midline. The Memory task also used a wireless 
mouse, to the preferred side of the start button. 
Movement task. The basic task was to point to a target dot presented on screen. The 
dot size was medium (14 pixel radius) in the baseline block, and small or large (10 or 18 
pixel radius) in the main block. The purpose of the baseline block was to provide experience 
                                                          
1Data were lost for three participants in the Movement task, and two participants in the Memory task, due to 
computer errors at testing. Fifteen participants failed to complete the Movement task due to an excess of time-
errors. Three further participants were excluded for the Movement task, and thirty-seven participants for the 
Memory task, due to an inability to fit a significant binomial logistic regression to online self-estimations. 
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of the task, and to obtain an independent measurement of performance. The task experienced 
in the baseline block was not identical to that in the main block, because different target sizes 
were used, but it was neither easier nor harder than the main block task, because the average 
target size was the same. 
On each trial, a white dot was shown on a black screen, with its centre positioned 
randomly within a 700 pixel virtual square around the screen centre. Dot presentation was 
initiated by the participant depressing the start button. The dot disappeared as soon as the 
participant released the button to initiate a response, so the participant could not directly 
observe whether or not their hand landed on target. The response was a paced reaching 
movement to the position of the dot, aiming to synchronize arrival with an auditory tone (100 
ms, 500 Hz), which onset 450 ms after the initiation of the response (i.e. button release). If a 
touch was registered within 350 ms, or if no touch was registered within 500 ms, a time-error 
message (“TOO FAST” or “TOO SLOW”) was shown, and the trial was recycled. This 
narrow time window was imposed to limit the scope to trade speed against accuracy, ensuring 
that differences in task skill would be measurable in terms of accuracy. The baseline block 
continued until 100 valid responses were recorded, or was aborted after 150 total trials. 
If the baseline block was completed successfully, the participant progressed to the 
main block. Dot size (small or large) on each trial was selected pseudo-randomly, and the 
main block continued until 100 valid trials were recorded for each target size, or was aborted 
if more than 300 trials were performed in total. After each valid movement, a dialog box 
appeared with two buttons, the upper (green) button labelled “HIT” and the lower (red) 
button labelled “MISS”. The participant had to press one of the two buttons to report whether 
they thought that they hit the target location or not, providing an online record of self-
estimation. 
Online self-estimation is our focus in the present study; but we also collected more 
standard global estimates, immediately before and after the main block. Prospective global 
estimates, as well as retrospective estimates, have often been used in the context of the DKE 
(e.g. Edwards, Kellner, Sistrom, & Magyari, 2003; Feld et al., 2017; Parker, Alford, & 
Passmore, 2004; Simons, 2013; Tenenberg & Murphy, 2005), but they have an additional 
role in our design. It is possible that our use of online trial-by-trial reporting during the main 
block could affect retrospective global estimates, perhaps making them more accurate than 
usual, because of closer attention to performance during the task. The inclusion of 
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prospective estimates provides at least one global self-assessment that could not be 
influenced by the online reporting method. 
The prospective estimates were absolute, with one rating screen for each dot size 
(small and large), with the wording, “MOVEMENT TASK: YOU WILL HAVE HALF A 
SECOND TO REACH AND HIT A DOT OF THIS SIZE. OUT OF 100 ATTEMPTS, HOW 
MANY TIMES DO YOU THINK YOU WILL HIT THE DOT?”. The experimenter 
emphasised that the question related only to movements that were on-time, and that a ‘hit’ 
was a touch at the place that the dot had been shown. The participant touched a horizontal 
scale (0-100) to make their estimate, and a line appeared at the touched location. The 
participant could revise their estimate by retouching, or press “submit” to record the 
response. The order of rating screens (small or large dot first) was alternated between 
participants. For the retrospective ratings, the first two screens were identical to the 
prospective ratings except that the wording was in the past tense. Two further retrospective 
screens then asked for relative (percentile) estimates for each dot size: “OUT OF 100 
HEALTHY ADULTS DOING THIS TASK, HOW DO YOU THINK YOU WILL 
COMPARE, IF 0 IS WORST AND 100 IS BEST?”. 
Memory task. The Memory task followed a similar format except that the instruction 
was to memorize the position of the dot and then release the button. Once the button was 
released, a dynamic white-noise mask filled the screen for 1000 ms, after which the screen 
returned to black except for a white crosshair cursor (6 pixel radius) at the screen centre. The 
participant used the mouse to guide the cursor to the remembered position, clicking to 
confirm their response, with no time limit. The prospective and retrospective self-estimates 
were identical to those for the Movement task, except for the precise wording, for instance, 
“MEMORY TASK: YOU WILL HAVE TO REMEMBER AND CLICK THE POSITION 
OF A DOT OF THIS SIZE. OUT OF 100 ATTEMPTS, HOW MANY TIMES DO YOU 
THINK YOU WILL HIT THE DOT?”. 
 
Data treatment and dependent variables 
The first ten valid trials of baseline blocks were discarded as practice. For every other valid 
trial, response error was expressed as the number of pixels deviation from the boundary of the 
dot, with responses within the boundary coded as negative and responses beyond the 
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boundary as positive. Response error was then converted into a binary hit (1) or miss (0), 
defining a hit within a six pixel penumbra around the dot.2 
The percentage hit rate in the baseline block is a measure of performance that is 
independent from the calculation of estimation errors, and provides our general index of task 
skill. Performance in the main block is used in the calculation of estimation error. There were 
four global measures of self-estimated performance. The online self-estimations provided an 
overall online estimated hit rate, and the global rating screens provided prospective and 
retrospective absolute estimates, and a retrospective relative estimate. To convert these into 
estimation errors, we subtracted the actual hit rate in the main block; or, for the relative 
estimate, the main block hit rate expressed as a percentile relative to other participants in the 
analysis. Positive estimation errors reflect overestimation and negative estimation errors 
underestimation. 
For the psychophysical analysis of metacognitive insight, we fitted a binomial logistic 
regression to predict the self-estimation report (hit or miss) from the objective response error, 
for each participant. From this function, we calculated the subjective error threshold (SET) 
for distinguishing a hit from a miss, as the response error for which the probability of 
reporting a hit was .5. Lower SETs represent more conservative criteria for success and 
higher SETs more liberal criteria (a SET of six would be perfectly calibrated to the objective 
criterion for a hit). Variations in SET may reflect real differences in where participants 
perceive the boundary between accurate and inaccurate performance to be, and it will also be 
affected by more general response biases. For instance, a general (optimistic) bias to report a 
hit, unless one is certain that the response was unsuccessful, will push the value of SET 
upwards. Overall, SET can be interpreted as indicating how strict or lenient participants are in 
assessing their own performance. We also calculated the just noticeable difference (JND), 
following convention, as half of the stimulus (response error) difference associated with a 
change in the probability of reporting a hit between .75 and .25 (i.e. the semi-interquartile 
difference). Lower JNDs reflect steeper psychophysical functions, representing higher 
sensitivities of self-estimation; higher JNDs reflect more shallow functions, representing 
lower sensitivities. 
                                                          
2Pilot testing with fully visible dots found that this penumbra was needed for an effective alignment of the 
objective criterion with the subjective impression of the fingertip overlapping the dot; and, in the Memory task, 
six pixels was the radius of the response cursor. 
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Figure 1 shows worked examples of this analysis for the Movement task, for one 
participant with good metacognitive insight, and one with poor insight. Participant 32 (Figure 
1a) has a steep transition from hit to miss responses (JND = 5.55 pixels), calibrated almost-
perfectly to the objective threshold of 6 pixels (SET = 6.09 pixels). The transition for 
Participant 49 (Figure 1b) is much more shallow (JND = 16.96 pixels), and miss reports do 
not reach a majority until the objective error is quite large (SET = 43.63 pixels). In these 
examples, metacognitive sensitivity (JND) and calibration (SET) are both relatively low 
(Participant 32) or relatively high (Participant 49); but in principle these measures could vary 
independently. Participants were excluded at the binary logistic regression stage if either type 
of self-report (hit or miss) was too infrequent to model reliably (fewer than ten reports overall 
for that category), or if the regression did not find a significant effect of response error, as 
assessed by the Wald test (p > 0.05). In these cases, neither SET nor JND could be 
meaningfully estimated.3 
Our main inferential analyses were based on ranked data (i.e. Spearman, rather than 
Pearson correlations). This makes minimal distributional assumptions, allowing us to pre-
specify our analyses fully, and to avoid data transformation and unnecessary exclusions. 
Kruger & Dunning’s original (1999) report of the DKE divided participants into sub-groups 
using performance quartiles. However, where we wish to form sub-groups, we will use 
performance tertiles (low, middle, high). This allows more participants per subgroup, but 
should not alter the overall patterns observed. 
  
                                                          
3Three participants were excluded from the Movement task, and 37 participants from the Memory task, by these 
criteria. See Supplemental materials S2 for consideration of the influence of these exclusions on our findings. 
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Experiment 1: Results 
Estimation errors and performance 
The DKE is assessed via the relationship between performance and estimation errors. The 
expected pattern is a negative correlation, with poorer performers showing more 
overestimation than good performers. In the present study, we have two measures of 
performance (hit rate in the main block, and in the baseline block), and four measures of 
estimation error (online, prospective absolute, retrospective absolute, and retrospective 
relative). All eight pairings of performance and estimation error are plotted in Figure 2a for 
the Movement task, and in Figure 2b for the Memory task. Each panel shows the mean 
estimation error for each tertile of performance, and the correlation across all participants. 
The correlations are all negative, but vary in strength. Negative correlations are 
stronger if the measure of performance is taken from the main block (upper rows in Figures 
2a and 2b). This is expected, because this measure of performance is also used in the 
calculation of estimation error, so these correlations are prone to regression to the mean. To 
remove this artefact, we should index performance by hit rate in the baseline block. Baseline 
performance is sufficiently related to that in the main block (ρ = .58 and .79 for Movement 
and Memory tasks respectively), that we can meaningfully treat baseline performance as an 
index of task skill. When estimation errors are plotted as a function of baseline performance, 
the pattern of negative correlation persists, albeit at a reduced level (lower rows in Figures 2a 
and 2b). 
Negative correlations are generally stronger when self-estimation is relative, 
presumably because a relative estimate is affected not only by uncertainty over one’s own 
performance, but also by uncertainty over other people’s. To the extent that the DKE is 
driven by uncertainty of estimation, it will be inflated for relative estimates. Negative 
correlations persist when self-estimates are absolute, though these are generally more modest, 
and the tendency to under- or overestimation in top performers is less consistent, as 
previously noted (Dunning, 2011; Ehrlinger et al., 2008). Most importantly for present 
purposes, negative correlations are obtained for online self-estimation (lower left panels of 
Figures 2a and 2b; ρ = -.30 and -.58 for Movement and Memory tasks respectively). 
 
 







hit rate Online EE SET JND 
Main block 
hit rate 
- .09 -.60 -.49 -.56 
Estimated 
hit rate 
.20 - .71 .74 -.25 
Online EE -.74 .45 - .95 .17 
SET -.38 .70 .86 - .27 
JND -.75 -.15 .57 .45 - 
Table 1. Experiment 1. Spearman’s ρ for correlations amongst performance and online self-
estimation measures in the main block for the Movement task (n=80) (unshaded upper cells), 
and the Memory task (n=62) (shaded lower cells). The significance threshold would be ≥ .22 
for the Movement task and ≥ .26 for the Memory task (two-tailed, uncorrected, alpha = .05). 
Values exceeding this threshold are shown in bold. 
 
We now focus on online self-estimation. Table 1 shows the inter-correlations amongst key 
measures from the main block. In both tasks, the relationship between hit rate and online 
estimated hit rate, was non-significant (Movement task, ρ = .09, n = 80, p = .45; Memory 
task, ρ = .20, n = 62, p = .15). At face-value, participants seem to have no insight into their 
own performance. However, lack of insight at an individual level cannot be inferred from this 
result, because global estimation error conflates possible influences of metacognitive 
sensitivity and calibration (and other task-induced biases: Burson et al., 2006; Krueger & 
Mueller, 2002). Our online self-estimation method allows us to disentangle these aspects of 
metacognition, via the measures SET and JND. The fact that these measures could be 
meaningfully extracted for the majority of participants actually demonstrates that they did 
have significant insight into their performance. 
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In both tasks, participants with higher hit rates showed sharper sensitivity to response 
error (lower JND), and a more conservative SET criterion for claiming a hit. Table 1 further 
shows strong positive relationships between online estimation error and our metacognitive 
measures, especially SET. This pattern, in which metacognitive sensitivity and calibration are 
associated both with task performance and with estimation errors, makes it possible that they 
could partially or wholly account for the DKE. 
We assess the DKE with respect to baseline performance, to eliminate regression to 
the mean. Figure 3 shows how baseline performance relates to our online self-estimation 
measures. The top row shows the full scattergrams for the online DKE already seen in the 
lower left panels of Figures 2a and 2b. The lower rows show our measures of metacognitive 
insight. Insight was generally poorer for the Memory task than for the Movement task, with 
higher JNDs, indicating lower sensitivity to own performance, and higher SETs, indicating 
more lax criteria for self-estimation. Participants thus had less insight into their performance 
in the Memory task, probably because this task was even more cryptic than the Movement 
task in terms of available feedback. The high number of participants excluded from the 
Memory task (n =37), due to a failure to fit a significant logistic regression, could also reflect 
generally less insight in this task.4 
Crucially, in both tasks, participants in the top tertile showed sharper sensitivity to 
their performance (lower JND), and a SET which was both more conservative and better 
calibrated to the objective criterion for success (response error of six pixels or less). The 
lower tertile of performance included some participants with good metacognitive insight, but 
also featured some participants who were very insensitive (high JND) and/or had a very lax 
criterion (high SET). Poorer performance is therefore associated with poorer metacognitive 
insight in both tasks, consistent with the hypothesis that the DKE arises from metacognitive 
differences between more and less skilled participants (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). 
 
Does metacognitive insight mediate the DKE? 
A causal role for metacognitive differences cannot be tested directly, because the observed 
relationships are correlational; but we can test for a pattern of mediation that would support a 
                                                          
4See Supplemental materials S2 for consideration of the influence of these exclusions on our findings. 
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causal role. The DKE is represented by the negative relationship between baseline 
performance and online estimation error (lower left panels of Figures 2a and 2b). For each 
task, we assessed the influence of the variables mediating this relationship, via a path analysis 
with robust maximum likelihood estimation (Rosseel, 2012).5 
 According to the dual-burden account of the DKE (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), low 
skill entails poor performance and poor metacognitive insight, which together induce inflated 
estimation errors. In the present data, hit rate in the baseline block is the measure of task skill, 
and hit rate in the main block is the measure of task performance, while metacognitive insight 
is broken down into metacognitive calibration (SET) and sensitivity (JND). We can thus 
specify three indirect paths mediating between task skill and estimation error: a path via SET 
and a path via JND, which together give the total metacognitive path; and a third path via task 
performance. These indirect paths are shown in Figure 4, along with the estimated strength 
and significance of each. 
 In both tasks, SET and JND are higher amongst less skilled participants, and mediate 
the relationship between skill and estimation error (i.e. the DKE), but in opposing directions. 
Positive metacognitive calibration (high SET) tends to induce overestimation, promoting the 
DKE, but poor metacognitive sensitivity (high JND) tends to counteract it. The overall 
mediating effect of metacognition is negative, promoting the DKE, but this net influence is 
not significant in either task (Movement task -.13, p = .17; Memory task -.09, p = .31). The 
mediation by task performance is stronger, considerably so in the Memory task, and highly 
significant (Movement task -.18, p < .0005; Memory task -.51, p < .0005). 
  
                                                          
5Our pre-registered analysis for this section was based on a series of semi-partial correlations. Following the 
suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we have replaced this with a path analysis, which offers richer insights 
into the indirect paths mediating the DKE. 
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Experiment 1: Discussion 
This first experiment replicated all essential features of the DKE for two novel tasks, of 
movement and memory. This extends the generality of the DKE, suggesting that it is a near 
ubiquitous pattern for tasks that are neither trivially easy nor unreasonably difficult, and for 
which the available feedback is sufficiently cryptic to leave some uncertainty of self-
estimation. In these novel tasks, we replicated prior observations that the DKE is inflated if 
the index of performance is drawn from the same trials in which estimation error is measured, 
presumably due mainly to regression to the mean (Burson et al., 2006; Feld et al., 2017; 
Klayman et al., 1999). We also confirmed that the pattern is stronger for relative than for 
absolute global estimates (see Dunning, 2011). However, we further showed that the effect 
does not depend on uncertainties in making global estimates, because it is also replicated with 
a series of online reports of perceived success or failure in individual trials. 
 Metacognitive insight was generally better for the Movement task than for the 
Memory task, but metacognitive sensitivity and calibration were robustly related to actual 
performance in both tasks (Table 1), and the relationships remained significant when using 
the baseline measure of performance from a distinct set of trials (Figure 3). At least some low 
performers had very poor metacognitive sensitivity (high JND), whereas high performers had 
generally good sensitivity. Similarly, some low performers had very lax standards for 
reporting a hit (high SET), whilst high performers were relatively conservatively calibrated. 
These more conservative criteria were closer to the (non-arbitrary) objective criterion for 
success, so it seems reasonable to suggest that the self-estimations of high performers were 
not just more conservative, but better calibrated in absolute terms. It would thus seem that the 
unskilled are indeed less sensitive to their own performance, and unduly optimistic in their 
metacognitive calibration, as originally hypothesised by Kruger & Dunning (1999). 
 The critical question is whether these metacognitive differences mediate the negative 
correlation between task skill and estimation error (i.e. the DKE). A path analysis showed 
that lax metacognitive calibration (high SET) did promote the DKE, but that this was largely 
counteracted by an opposing effect of poor metacognitive sensitivity (high JND). Intuitively, 
a high JND indicates a shallower psychophysical function, which attenuates the importance 
of the precise point of transition represented by SET (see Supplemental materials S3, for a 
full explanatory model). In both tasks, the total effect of metacognitive factors was weakly to 
promote the DKE, but was not statistically significant. Task performance (hit rate) in the 
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main block mediated the majority of the DKE, and this indirect path between task skill and 
estimation error was highly significant in both tasks. 
 Given this suggestive pattern, we can ask a deeper experimental question about 
underlying causes. Specifically, we can seek to disentangle the two parts of the proposed 
dual-burden of the unskilled. One part is a lack of metacognitive insight, which we have 
confirmed, but which may play a minor role. The other is simply that performance itself is 
poor. As noted in Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) original report, incompetent individuals are 
at the bottom of the distribution, so it is nearly impossible for them to underestimate their 
relative rank (see also Krajč and Ortmann, 2008). On absolute scales too, low skill 
participants may be prone to overestimate just because they perform more poorly, having 
relatively more errors to mistake for successes. This potential bias, which we will call the 
‘performance artefact’, would cause regressive estimates, but is conceptually and practically 
distinct from the well-mapped, and relatively easily controlled artefact of regression to the 
mean. Our path analysis for Experiment 1 suggests that this performance artefact may 
substantially govern the DKE. 
 These considerations highlight a broader confound, intrinsic to the DKE, yet which 
has received remarkably little explicit consideration. The effect is widely understood as a 
relationship between task skill and estimation error, but the measurement of estimation error 
has only ever been done in situations in which high and low skill participants differ in their 
success at the task. This confounds the broader concept of task skill (ability for a class of 
task) with a narrow measure of task performance (level of success at current instance of task), 
so does not disentangle skill- and performance-driven effects. This might seem a subtle 
distinction, but it could be crucial to a correct understanding of the DKE. If a performance 
artefact exists such that a high rate of errors boosts overestimation, and vice-versa for a low 
rate of errors, then to study the effects of task-skill uncontaminated by this artefact, we 
should really compare estimation errors between high and low skill participants when they 
perform the task at equivalent rates of success. 
 A similar argument applies to our psychophysical measures of metacognition. We 
have implicitly assumed that these reflect relatively stable characteristics, which differ 
between people with different levels of task skill. But imagine instead that metacognition is 
more-or-less modulated by the current level of task performance. In particular, rather than 
having a fixed criterion for success (SET), a person might adopt a more conservative criterion 
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when objectively more successful, and a more lenient criterion when less successful. In 
plainer terms, we might expect much from ourselves when a task is easy, but give ourselves 
more leeway when conditions are difficult. For instance, in a general knowledge quiz, we 
might be satisfied only with exact answers in our specialist area, but happy with strong 
hunches for questions outside of our expertise. When aiming for a dot, we might want to land 
comfortably inside the boundary of a big dot, but be happy to clip the outside edge of a 
smaller dot. Again, one way to disentangle the effects of task skill from those of performance 
per se would be to study the predictive effects of task skill after differences in performance 
have been eliminated. 
This is the purpose of Experiment 2. We set out to test whether specific correlations 
between baseline performance and three measures of online self-estimation for the Movement 
task of Experiment 1 would be replicated if between-participant differences in performance 
(i.e. success rate) in the main block were experimentally eliminated. That is, we tested 
whether these relationships were driven by task skill, or by task performance. 
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Experiment 2: Methods 
The critical correlations from Experiment 1, under replication in Experiment 2, were between 
baseline performance and online estimation error (ρ = -.30), baseline performance and SET (ρ 
= -.26), and baseline performance and JND (ρ = -.37). Our methods and predictions were 
preregistered on the Open Science Framework https://osf.io/ccgsz/(see Supplemental 
materials S1). Experiment 2 was approved by the Psychology Research Committee, 
University of Edinburgh, as an extension to Experiment 1 (approval#105-16171). We report 
how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures. 
Only the Movement task was used in Experiment 2. All methods were exactly as for 
Experiment 1, except in the details described below.  
 
Participants and power 
Our plan was to calculate a Bayes factor after every ten participants (or nearest break point in 
testing) using the replication test for correlation developed by Wagenmakers, Verhagen & Ly 
(2016), to test between the hypothesis that the previously observed correlation was replicated 
and the null hypothesis of no correlation.6 Our primary stopping rule was to terminate data 
collection at the point that the Bayes factors for all three target correlations were sensitive, 
according to the cut-offs suggested by Jeffreys (1939) (i.e. greater than 3 or less than 1/3). 
Our secondary stopping rule, defined on frequentist grounds, was that we would stop data 
collection after 88 valid datasets, if the primary stopping condition had not been met. With a 
one-tailed alpha of .05 (because the direction of correlation is known), this would provide 
high power to replicate the correlation with online estimation error (power .90 for ρ = -.30 at 
n=88), and with JND (power .98 for ρ = -.37 at n=88), and adequate power to replicate the 
correlation with SET (power .80 for ρ = -.26 at n=88) (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 
2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). 
In fact, our primary stopping rule was met after 81 participants had been tested. These 
participants were students of the University of Edinburgh, with a median age of 20 years (min 
18, 1st quartile 19, median 20, 3rd quartile 23, max 32 years), and mostly female (60 female, 
                                                          
6 This replication Bayes factor was developed for Pearson correlations. We apply it in the present case to 
Spearman correlations, which are identical with Pearson correlations for ranked data. 
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21 male) and right-handed (74 right handed, 7 left-handed, by self-report). After exclusions, 
the final sample had 75 participants.7 
 
2.1. Procedure 
The procedure was the same as for the Movement task of Experiment 1, except as stated here. 
In order to try to minimise the number of participants excluded because of time-errors, any 
participant with an excess of time-errors in the baseline block was given a second attempt at 
this block. Participants were excluded for time-errors only if they produced an excess (>50) 
at two attempts of the baseline block, or an excess (>100) in the main block. In each case, the 
block was discontinued as soon as the maximum number of time-errors was exceeded. In 
practice, no participants were excluded because of time-errors. 
The main block was identical to the baseline block except that, rather than presenting 
a fixed set of dot sizes, the dot size varied from trial-to-trial. The initial radius, used on the 
first trial, was set to the median of the absolute deviation from the centre of the dot in the 
baseline block, rounded to the nearest pixel. Thereafter, each time that the participant hit a 
dot, the radius decreased by two pixels at the next trial; and each time the participant missed a 
dot, the radius increased by two pixels at the next trial. This simple adaptive rule was used to 
titrate the hit rate for each participant in the main block to around 50%. We expected high 
skill participants to be presented with generally smaller dots (a more difficult task), and low 
skill participants to be presented with generally larger dots (an easier task), and for all 
participants to have a similar level of success (~ 50%). 
As in Experiment 1, after every valid trial in the main block, the participant had to 
report whether they thought their response was a hit or a miss. Because we were interested 
specifically in online self-estimation, we did not include any prospective self-estimates before 
the main block. However, we did collect retrospective global self-estimates, as a no-cost add-
on. A first rating screen asked for an absolute estimate with the wording: “MOVEMENT 
TASK: IN THE LAST BLOCK, YOU HAD HALF A SECOND TO REACH AND HIT 
THE DOT. ON WHAT PERCENTAGE OF TRIALS DO YOU THINK YOU HIT THE 
DOT?”. A second rating screen then asked for a relative estimate: “OUT OF 100 HEALTHY 
                                                          
7One participant was excluded because performance in the main block did not fall within the required bounds, 
and five participants were excluded due to a failure to fit a significant binomial logistic regression. 
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ADULTS DOING THS TASK, HOW DO YOU THINK YOU WILL COMPARE, IF 0 IS 
WORST AND 100 IS BEST?” 
 
Data treatment and dependent variables 
The data treatment was identical to that in Experiment 1, except that the binomial logistic 
regression of online self-estimation reports included dot radius as a predictor in addition to 
response error. This was done because there was a potentially wide variation of dot sizes, and 
we wanted to account for any possible biasing influence of dot size itself (e.g. the participant 
might be more likely to report a hit simply because the target was bigger).8 SET and JND 
were calculated from the two-factor regression equation, for a dot radius of 14 pixels (the 
average dot size in Experiment 1). 
Participants were excluded at the analysis stage if the titration of performance levels 
failed, which we operationally defined as a hit rate in the main block below 45% or above 
55%. One participant was excluded on these grounds (hit rate 55.5%). We also excluded 
participants if the binomial logistic regression showed a multicollinearity problem, indicated 
by a variance inflation factor exceeding four, or if they had fewer than ten estimation 
responses available in either category (hit or miss), or if the regression did not find a 
significant effect of response error on self-estimated performance, as assessed by the Wald 
test (p > 0.05). In these cases, the psychophysical measures SET and JND could not be 
meaningfully estimated; five participants were excluded by these criteria. 
  
                                                          
8Dot size could also have been included as a predictor in Experiment 1, but we did not plan to do this, because 
pilot data had indicated that there was no advantage to doing so. The analyses reported for Experiments 1 and 2 
thus adhere to the preregistered plans, but the outcomes would not be meaningfully changed by including dot 
size as a predictor in Experiment 1, or by not including it as a predictor in Experiment 2. 
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Experiment 2: Results 
The top left panel of Figure 5 shows the successful titration to ~50% hit rate in the main 
block. The bottom two panels of Figure 5 show that, despite this levelling of performance, 
SET and JND have similar relationships to baseline performance as in Experiment 1 (cf. 
Figure 3). The correlation for SET was -.22 (vs. -.26 in Experiment 1), and the correlation for 
JND was -.38 (vs. -.37 in Experiment 1). For SET, the replication BF10 was 4.90, 
corresponding to ‘substantial’ evidence for replication, and for JND the replication BF10 was 
332.30, corresponding to ‘extreme’ evidence for replication (Jeffreys, 1939). These outcomes 
indicate that the psychophysical differences in metacognitive insight are driven by task skill, 
rather than by performance in the current instance of a task. 
However, the top right panel of Figure 5 shows that, despite the replication of these 
metacognitive differences, the DKE itself was not replicated. ‘Substantial’ evidence was 
instead found for the null hypothesis of no correlation between baseline performance and 
online estimation error (replication BF10 = 0.19). Figure 6 displays the mean estimation error 
for each tertile of baseline performance, for online estimation and also for the retrospective 
global ratings, confirming that the DKE was uniformly abolished by the levelling of main 
block performance. At face value, these data seem to undermine the idea that metacognitive 
differences could cause the DKE, because these differences are present, but the DKE is not. 
More precisely, the finding implies that the metacognitive differences are not sufficient for 




This conclusion can be further explored by a path analysis, structurally similar to that for 
Experiment 1, with three indirect paths mediating between task skill and estimation error: one 
path via main block performance; and dual metacognitive paths via SET and JND. The 
critical difference in Experiment 2 is that the strength of the links in the performance path 
have been experimentally pushed to zero, by eliminating systematic between-participant 
variance in main block performance. The path analysis is shown in Figure 7. The observed 
                                                          
9This path analysis was not part of our pre-registered plan, but was suggested by an anonymous reviewer. 
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performance path is null, as expected; but the metacognitive paths are strikingly similar to 
those for the Movement task in Experiment 1 (Figure 4a). Lax metacognitive calibration 
(high SET) tends to promote the DKE, but poor metacognitive sensitivity (high JND) 
attenuates the pattern, and the total metacognitive path is weak and not significant (-.05, p = 
.67). In the absence of performance differences, the DKE depends on metacognitive factors 
alone, and disappears (-.05, p = .65). 
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Experiment 2: Discussion 
Experiment 2 found that the metacognitive differences between high and low performers are 
related directly to task skill, independent of current level of performance, because these 
differences persisted unchanged when success in the main block was levelled (at ~50%). This 
supports the idea that metacognitive insight may depend, to some extent, on the same core 
competencies that constitute task-skill (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). A similar result was not 
found for the DKE itself, which was eliminated by the removal of performance differences in 
the main block. This supports the suggestion from Experiment 1, that a performance artefact 
is the main driver of the DKE, under typical circumstances in which high and low skill 
participants differ in level of success at a task. By contrast, metacognitive calibration and 
sensitivity had directionally opposite influences on estimation error, which largely cancelled 
out, so that metacognitive factors did not significantly mediate the DKE overall. 
 The above pattern describes the present data, but this does not mean that the dual-
burden account could never provide an appropriate explanation of the DKE. Metacognitive 
and performance differences may conspire to create the DKE, as proposed originally by 
Kruger and Dunning (1999), in some tasks or circumstances. For instance, if the link between 
task skill and metacognitive calibration were very much stronger than in our data, then a 
substantial mediational role for metacognition could be envisaged. However, the dual burden 
account is not generally necessary to explain the DKE, since performance differences alone 
are capable of inducing the effect, assuming only that metacognitive insight is imperfect. 
 The key interactions can be captured by a simple graphical model, which shows how 
estimation errors would vary across two levels of metacognitive skill, and three levels of task 
performance, given a Gaussian distribution of response errors (Figure 8a).10 The headline 
outcome in each panel is the overall estimation error (EE). The dual-burden account assumes 
that performance and metacognition are tightly yoked, so that the DKE is specific to the 
contrast between a low performer with poor metacognition (bottom right panel, EE = 37), and 
a high performer with good metacognition (top-left panel, EE = 4). But, in fact, just as great a 
contrast would emerge between a low performer with poor metacognition (bottom right 
panel, EE = 37), and a high performer with equally poor metacognition (top right panel, EE = 
                                                          
10This illustration is a sub-set of the possible combinations of performance level, metacognitive sensitivity and 
metacognition calibration. A wider range of possibilities, more fully mapping the complex interactions between 
these factors, is provided in Supplemental materials S3. 
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4). Figure 8b further shows that a similar pattern can arise from performance differences 
alone, when participants have no metacognitive insight at all: compare the low performer 
with no metacognition (bottom panel, EE = 47) and the high performer with no 
metacognition (top panel, EE = -4). This last contrast is essentially Burson and colleagues' 
(2006) noise plus bias model, applied to absolute self-estimation. It is included to make the 
wider point that the DKE pattern alone does not imply metacognitive insight for anyone, let 
alone systematic metacognitive differences between skilled and unskilled participants. 
 Metacognitive differences may exist between high and low performers, as observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2, but such differences do not necessarily drive the DKE. Conversely, the 
DKE pattern does not imply underlying metacognitive differences, since the same superficial 
relationship between task skill and estimation errors can be driven by a performance artefact, 
provided only that participants have imperfect insight into their performance. In general, the 
metacognitive differences that are widely held to underpin the DKE are not established by the 
DKE itself, but must be demonstrated independently for any given task. 
  
Page 29 of 43 
General discussion 
Since the seminal paper establishing the DKE, there has been debate over whether the effect 
derives from metacognitive differences between skilled and unskilled people (Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999), from general biases of self-estimation (Burson et al., 2006; Krueger & 
Mueller, 2002), or from statistical artefacts (Feld et al., 2017; Krajč & Ortmann, 2008; 
Krueger & Mueller, 2002). Despite vigorous defences of the metacognitive account 
(Dunning, 2011; Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Kruger & Dunning, 2002; Schlösser, Dunning, 
Johnson, & Kruger, 2013), and its enthusiastic dissemination through the wider culture, 
unambiguous evidence has not been provided, and the debate has persisted. The present paper 
offers a resolution between competing accounts, showing that each of these factors can 
contribute to shaping the typical DKE. Our studies employ novel tasks, and online self-
estimation. In drawing our main conclusions, we assume generalisation from these methods 
to other tasks; and we consider the likely limits of this assumption. 
In both Movement and Memory tasks, poor performers did indeed show worse 
insight, having lower sensitivity to variations in their performance, and more lax standards 
for success, being willing to claim a hit even when the spatial error was large. This pattern 
was found in some, though not all, poor performers, whilst high performers showed good 
metacognitive abilities, being more sensitive, and having stricter standards, better calibrated 
to the objective criterion. These metacognitive differences correspond well with Kruger and 
Dunning's (1999) original concept of a metacognitive deficit amongst the unskilled. 
However, the effect size that these differences could account for was vanishingly small by 
comparison with the DKE as widely depicted (e.g. by the famous Figure 1 of Kruger & 
Dunning, 1999). This is because several other biases strongly influence and inflate the effect. 
The DKE is inflated if the measure of performance is drawn from the same trials as 
used in the calculation of estimation error. In Experiment 1, the correlations between 
performance and estimation error were smaller in magnitude by around ~ .3 for the 
Movement task and ~ .2 for the Memory task, when using a measure of performance from 
separate (baseline) trials (see Figure 2). Most of this discrepancy is almost certainly due to 
regression to the mean (Ackerman et al., 2002; Burson et al., 2006; Feld et al., 2017; Krueger 
& Mueller, 2002; Nuhfer et al., 2016, 2017). The DKE is also stronger for relative than for 
absolute self-estimates, probably due to regressive effects associated with the added 
uncertainty about how other people perform (Moore & Healy, 2008). The combined effect of 
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these two methodological factors can be dramatic. In the Movement task of Experiment 1, the 
DKE was represented by a correlation of -.92 when relative estimates and main block 
performance were considered, yet receded to non-significant levels (as weak as -.07) for 
absolute estimates and baseline performance. 
Our main operational measure of the DKE in these studies was the correlation 
between task-skill (baseline performance) and online estimation error. However, a path 
analysis showed that this correlation was principally mediated by performance differences 
between high and low skill participants, rather than by differences in metacognitive insight. 
Low performers may overestimate more, just because they have more failures about which to 
be mistaken. This performance artefact is importantly distinct from the well-mapped 
influence of regression to the mean. The performance artefact is one part of the original dual-
burden account of the DKE, but there has nonetheless been remarkably little discussion of the 
causal role of performance per se, as opposed to metacognitive factors. This may be because 
the dual-burden account assumes that performance and metacognitive factors are necessarily 
yoked; but the present study has shown that these influences are separable, both in principle 
and in practice. In Experiment 2, when we levelled the performance across participants, the 
metacognitive differences between more and less skilled people persisted, but the DKE itself 
was abolished. Thus, although the metacognitive differences are real, at least for our tasks, 
they are not sufficient for the DKE. 
Moreover, considering that several other biases can induce the DKE, we must 
conclude that neither metacognitive differences, nor even the full dual-burden, are necessary 
for the effect. Estimation error depends in complex ways upon the particular mix of 
metacognitive sensitivity and calibration, and the distribution of response errors, and it is 
certainly not a direct read-out of metacognitive skill. If this is true for our Movement and 
Memory tasks, then it may be even more so for higher intellectual and social tasks, where the 
task itself may be more complex, the size of the response error more ambiguous, the 
objective criterion for success more opaque, and the feedback more cryptic. Furthermore, if 
making global self-estimates, rather than trial-by-trial judgements, uncertainty can only 
increase, especially if required to rank oneself relative to unknown others. We would suggest 
that metacognitive insight is highly unlikely to be a more direct determinant of estimation 
error in such complex scenarios. Of course, the role of metacognition in the DKE for any 
specific task or domain is an empirical question, and an important step will be to apply our 
analytical approach to the higher-level intellectual skills more typical of the DKE literature. 
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But if the broader scientific aim is to study metacognition, then researchers should strive to 
use measures that are free from the many confounds that estimation errors entail. Our adapted 
psychophysical approach is one possibility, appropriate given the distribution of response 
errors in our tasks. A range of more evolved alternative methods also exist, which can be 
applied where suitable tasks can be devised (Fleming & Lau, 2014). 
None of our findings cast doubt on the DKE as an empirical phenomenon. On the 
contrary, our data extend the classic pattern to novel domains. It is widely true that poor 
performers overestimate themselves more than high performers, and our data confirm that 
poor performers may indeed have less metacognitive insight than high performers. But it 
would be a gross misrepresentation to say that poor insight is the reason for overestimation 
amongst the unskilled. At least as much explanatory work is done by performance artefacts, 
and the pattern can be induced (and greatly inflated) by a host of other factors and biases, 
some psychologically interesting, and some ‘merely’ statistical. Shakespeare’s poetic 
depictions of the fool and the wise man are thus as apt as ever. By contrast, the modern meme 
that stupid people are too stupid to know they are stupid is a dramatic oversimplification, 
propounded (perhaps) by those who know sufficiently little of the evidence. 
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Context 
Our interest in the Dunning-Kruger effect (DKE) stems from our work on anosognosia for 
hemiplegia following brain damage. This is a condition in which patients with a weak or 
paralysed limb seem to be unaware of their disability. When asked to move a paralysed arm, 
a patient with anosognosia may report that they have done so, despite the fact that they 
manifestly have not. The DKE has been proposed as “a psychological analogue to 
anosognosia”, arising in healthy people who are unskilled in a specific domain (Kruger & 
Dunning, 2002, p. 1130). We conceived our tasks originally to study self-estimation in 
clinical populations, but we began by collecting control data, in groups of healthy young and 
older adults. We quickly became interested in the patterns emerging, and saw the potential 
value of our methods for testing the role of metacognition in the DKE. These unpublished 
studies provided rich pilot data for the present experiments, allowing us to optimise our tasks, 
and to preregister our design, with well-informed power analyses and clear predictions. 
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Figure 1. Examples of the analysis of metacognitive insight for the Movement task, for one 
participant with good metacognitive insight (a), and one with poor insight (b). In each panel, 
the histogram shows response frequency by size of response error, across 200 pointing 
movements, with negative errors inside the dot boundary and positive errors beyond the dot 
boundary. The vertical dotted line indicates the objective threshold for a hit, which includes 
any responses within a six pixel penumbra around the dot. The histogram is shaded by the 
frequency with which the participant reported a hit (light grey) or a miss (dark grey). The black 
curve is the logistic function relating the probability (p) of reporting a hit to the size of the 
response error, with the best-fitting equation shown at the top of the panel. Metacognitive 
calibration is measured by the subjective error threshold (SET), at which the participant is 
equally likely to report a hit or a miss, given by the x intercept for p = .50. Metacognitive 
sensitivity is measured by the just noticeable difference (JND), given by (half of) the difference 
in response error between p = .25 and p = .75.  
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Figure 2. Experiment 1. Relation between performance and estimation error for (a) the 
movement task (n = 80) and (b) the memory task (n = 62). Performance is defined by hit rate 
in the main block (upper row) or the baseline block (lower row). Estimation error is derived 
from online self-estimation, prospective or retrospective absolute estimates, or a retrospective 
relative (percentile) estimate. The means are split by performance tertile (where 1 is lower and 
3 is upper). Black squares show means (+/- between-subject 95% CIs) across all targets. Small 
and large grey circles show means (+/- 95% within-subject CIs) for small and large targets 
respectively. Spearman’s rho is reported for each plot, indexing the strength of relation between 
actual performance and estimation error across all participants. 
  
Page 38 of 43 
 
Figure 3. Experiment 1. Relation of baseline block performance (% hit rate) to online self-
estimation measures for the main block, for the movement task (n = 80) and memory task (n = 
62), with Spearman’s ρ for each plot. Participants in the middle tertile of performance are 
plotted as unfilled dots to visually separate performance tertiles. One outlying participant is 
omitted from the SET and JND plots for the memory task to avoid compression of the y-axis; 
this bottom-tertile participant had extremely high values for SET (207) and JND (156).  
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Figure 4. Path analysis for Experiment 1 (a) Movement task and (b) Memory task. The DKE 
is represented by the relationship between task skill (SKILL = hit rate in baseline block) and 
online estimation error (EE in main block). The variables hypothesised to mediate the DKE 
are metacognitive calibration (SET), metacognitive sensitivity (JND) and task performance 
(PERFORM = hit rate in main block). The standardised path strength (correlation coefficient) 
is shown on the diagram for each link. The estimated strength of each path (given by the 
product of its two links) is tabulated, with 95% confidence intervals and associated p value. 
The summed path strengths for SET and JND give an estimate of the total mediational effect 
of Metacognition. The summed path strengths for Metacognition and Performance give the 
total DKE. Also included in the model, but omitted from the figure, are the correlations 
between SET, JND, and PERFORM, to ensure that the null hypothesis of a well-fitting model 
is not rejected (Movement task χ2 = 1.08, df = 1, p = .30; Memory task χ2 = 2.01, df = 1, p = 
.16). 
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Figure 5. Experiment 2 (n=75). Relation of baseline block performance to (levelled) main 
block performance, and three online self-estimation measures, with Spearman’s ρ for each 
plot. Participants in the middle tertile of task skill are plotted as unfilled dots to visually 
separate performance tertiles. The top left plot confirms that the titration of task performance 
was effective, levelling performance to 50% across the spectrum of task skill. Unlike in 
Experiment 1, there is no significant relationship between baseline performance and online 
estimation error, but negative relationships with both SET and JND are replicated. 
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Figure 6. Experiment 2 (n = 75). Relation between baseline performance and estimation 
error. Estimation error is derived from online self-estimation, a retrospective absolute 
estimate, or a retrospective relative (percentile) estimate. The means are split by baseline 
performance tertile (where 1 is lower and 3 is upper). Error bars show between-subject 95% 
CIs. Spearman’s rho is reported for each plot, indexing the strength of relation between 
baseline performance and estimation error across all participants. The expected DKE pattern, 
of a negative relationship between baseline performance and estimation error, is absent, due 
to performance (hit rate) having been levelled in the main block. Note that the relative 
estimation errors are somewhat meaningless in this context. They are calculated from the 
subtraction of actual percentile from estimated percentile but, due to the levelling of 
performance, the actual percentiles are determined by tiny differences within a compressed 
range (45-55% hit rate). 
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Figure 7. Path analysis for Experiment 2, similar to that for Experiment 1 (Figure 4). The 
DKE is represented by the relationship between task skill (SKILL = hit rate in baseline block) 
and online estimation error (EE in main block). The variables hypothesised to mediate the 
DKE are metacognitive calibration (SET), metacognitive sensitivity (JND) and task 
performance (PERFORM = hit rate in main block). The standardised path strength 
(correlation coefficient) is shown on the diagram for each link. The estimated strength of 
each path (given by the product of its two links) is tabulated, with 95% confidence intervals 
and associated p value. The summed path strengths for SET and JND give an estimate of the 
total mediational effect of Metacognition. The summed path strengths for Metacognition and 
Performance give the total DKE. Note that the links in the performance path have been 
experimentally pushed to zero by our performance levelling technique, so the DKE is wholly 
mediated by Metacognition, and is effectively absent. Also included in the model, but omitted 
from the figure, are the correlations between SET, JND, and PERFORM, to ensure that the 
null hypothesis of a well-fitting model is not rejected (χ2 = 0.02, df = 1, p = .89). 
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Figure 8. (a) Illustration of the combined effects of metacognitive insight and performance 
level (i.e. success rate) on total estimation error. Each plot shows a normal distribution of 
errors, shaded according to the proportion of hit reports (light grey) and miss reports (dark 
grey) at each level of error, tracked by a psychophysical function (curved black line). Good 
metacognition has a steep function, centred relatively close to the objective threshold for 
success (vertical black line). Poor metacognition has a shallower function, centred further 
rightward. Underestimation occurs when a miss is reported for an objective hit, so the total 
underestimation (U) is given by the dark grey area to the left of the vertical black line. 
Overestimation occurs when a hit is reported for an objective miss, so the total 
overestimation (O) is given by the light grey area to the right of the vertical black line. 
Estimation error (EE) is given by the difference (O-U), with all values expressed as a 
percentage (to the nearest percent) of total responses. EE varies with metacognitive insight, 
but it also varies with level of performance on the current instance of the task. These 
influences interact. (b) Participants are here modelled to have no metacognitive insight at all, 
but to show an (optimistic) response bias, reporting hits on a majority of trials regardless of 
response error. This can also produce the pattern of gross overestimation amongst low 
performers, and more accurate estimation amongst high performers. 
